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EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF ZIPF’S LAW 





This paper considers the distribution of output and productive factors among members of a 
fully integrated economy (FIE). We demonstrate that each member’s shares of total output 
and of total factors will be equal. This implies that growth in shares is random. If output and 
factor shares evolve as reflective geometric Brownian motion, then limiting distribution of 
these shares will exhibit Zipf’s law. Our empirics support Zipf’s law for U.S. states and for 
E.U. countries. These findings imply that models characterizing growth of members within an 
FIE should embody a key assumption: growth process of shares is random and homogeneous. 
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Institute. Evidence and Implications of Zipf’s Law for Integrated Economies 
The number of regional trade agreements has increased continuously since the early 
1990s and many new initiatives for special association agreements are currently being 
negotiated (see WTO website).  Institutional arrangements under which countries open their 
borders differ in reality. Most agreements are designed to increase international trade 
between markets but a few, like the European Union, also allow greater mobility of 
productive factors within the integrated area.  In the limit, such integration would be 
represented by a fully integrated economy (FIE) in which there is free mobility of goods and 
factors among FIE members together with complete harmonization of economic and social 
policies. 
While prior work has demonstrated the potentially important role of trade
1 and factor 
mobility
2 as influences on economic growth, less attention has been given to the question of 
how trade and factor mobility impact the distribution of output across members of a FIE, and 
hence how these influences affect the relative economic position of members.  Apart from 
being simply a question of distributional consequences, analysis of this question has 
important implications for the nature of models that can be used to characterize the growth 
processes of FIE members.  Specifically, as we will show in this paper, the distribution of 
output and factor shares across FIE members can be expected to conform to a rank-share 
distribution that exhibit Zipf’s law, which indicates a specific relationship between the rank 
                                                 
1 An extensive body of work has explored the role of international trade and of factor mobility as mechanisms 
generating endogenous economic growth.  For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that trade 
generally enhances growth, particularly when it facilitates the international transmission of knowledge. 
Similarly, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) show that increased trade due to economic integration may have both 
level and growth effects depending upon the processes by which R&D and information flow across borders.  
Devereux and Lapham (1994) extend Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s model to show that, even without knowledge 
flows, the balanced growth rate when there is free trade in goods alone exceeds that in autarky, provided that 
initial levels of national income differ across countries. 
2 For example, Baldwin and Martin (2004) examine the relationship between growth and the agglomeration of 
economic activity and find that it depends crucially on the extent of capital mobility between regions. Similarly, 
Viaene and Zilcha (2002) show that while complete capital market integration among countries has a positive 
effect on outputs, it does not raise long-run growth rates above autarky values. Instead, these growth rates are 
affected only by parameters that describe the accumulation of human capital. 
1 and value of a variable.  This result implies that models used to characterize the growth of 
members within an FIE must embody a key assumption: that the underlying growth process 
of shares is random and homogeneous across members. 
Country shares of regional (or world) output, or shares of a region’s total supplies of 
productive factors, have become increasingly important constructs in the international trade 
literature (e.g., Bowen et al., 1987; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Leamer, 1984; Viaene and 
Zilcha, 2002).  In this regard, below we first demonstrate that, within an FIE, each member’s 
share of total FIE output will equal its shares of total FIE stocks of each productive factor 
(i.e., physical capital and human capital).  If economic policies are largely harmonized across 
members then this equal-share property implies that the growth in any member’s shares of 
FIE output and factor stocks can be taken to be a random outcome. Following Gabaix 
(1999a), if output and factor shares evolve as geometric Brownian motion with a lower 
bound, then the limiting distribution of these shares will exhibit Zipf’s law.  Given this result, 
we then show that the limiting values of each FIE member’s output and factor shares are 
completely determined once the number of FIE members is specified.  
Given the theoretical expectation of Zipf’s law for output and factor shares, we 
empirically examine for this law within two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 U.S. 
states and 14 countries of the European Union (E.U.).  The data generally cover the period 
from 1965 to 2000.  Our empirical results convincingly support Zipf’s law for U.S. states and 
for E.U. countries. 
1  Equality of Output and Factor Shares in Integrated Economies 
To demonstrate the equality of output and factor shares for each member of a fully 
integrated economy we consider an integrated economy that consists of m  = 1, …, M 
members, each producing a single good by means of a constant return to scale production 
function of the form: 
2 (1)    m = 1, …, M  ( , ) mt mt mt YF K H =
where Ymt is the level of output, Kmt the stock of physical capital, and Hmt the stock of human 
capital, all for country m at time t.  The production function is assumed to satisfy all the 
neoclassical assumptions including diminishing marginal productivity with respect to each 
factor.  For ease of exposition, the production function is assumed to take the Cobb Douglas 
form:
3 
(2)    m = 1, …, M  
1 m
mt mt mt mt YA K H
αα − =
m
where Amt is a scale parameter and α  is capital’s share of total output.  If physical capital 
and labor are perfectly mobile between the M economies then we would expect the marginal 
product of each factor to be equal.  Barriers to capital mobility (e.g. corporate income tax 
differentials, capital controls) or labor mobility (e.g. language, different pension systems) 
would instead create persistent differences in factor rates of returns between members.   
Consider one reference member of this integrated economy that, without loss of generality, 
we take to be country i.  Let   and   define the proportional difference in rates of return 
to physical capital and to human capital between any country m and reference country i.  The 
























where νm = αm/αi, implying νm = 1 when αm = αi  (m = 1, ..., M).  Note that for m = i,   





















                                                
 
 
3 The Cobb-Douglas specification has wide empirical support (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992).  The analysis can be 
extended to the case where the production function has the constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) form. 




i α = m m = αi  (m = 1, ..., M).   Note that for m 
= i,   and  . The ratio of (3) to (4) gives the following relationship between ratios 
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Combining (5) and (6) yields the following relationship between output and factor shares for 
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  i = 1, …, M 
We term equation (7) the “equal-share” relationship.  This relationship determines the 
distribution of output and the distribution of factors across M members of an integrated 
economy.  Expression (7) contains both observable variables (YK ) and unknown 
parameters .  Differences in technology or factor market imperfections imply a 
multiplicative rescaling of the observable variables that is different for each ratio.  For 
example, a difference in α’s leaves the observed values (and share) of physical capital 
unaffected but transforms the observed values of output and human capital in different ways 
, , mt mt mt H
( , , )
kh
mmm αλλ
4 (through  vm and η  respectively).  If we assume that the M members of the integrated 
economy share the same technology (ην ), and that there is costless (perfect) 
mobility of factors ( ), then we obtain the simplest expression of the equal-share 
relationship for any member i: 
m
1 mm m ω ===
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   i = 1, …, M 
Hence, with perfect capital mobility and similar technology, each economy’s share of total 
FIE output, and each economy’s share of total FIE physical capital stock, equals its share of 
the total FIE stock of human capital.   
Relationship (8) has an important implication.  It contrasts the policies pursued in 
isolation by any given FIE member with those that are instead pursued jointly (harmonized) 
across members.  For example, (8) remains unchanged when a coordinated educational policy 
by all FIE members increases their human capital by the same proportion.  In contrast, the 
same policy implemented by only one member increases that member’s share of total FIE 
human capital (as long as this policy is not imitated by other members).  Hence, if FIE 
members have harmonized economic and social policies (e.g., fiscal, education, industrial 
policies) then the equal-share property implies that the relative performance of each member 
remains unaffected by these policies.  In this sense, member shares can be considered to be a 
random variable whose outcome is dependent on the particular state of nature at time t.  Such 
randomness can easily be understood from the fact that various kinds of random shocks, like 
discoveries, weather, or natural disasters, including some that are specific to a particular 
member, would give rise to new and different sets of shares for all members. 
5 2  Rank-Share Distributions and Zipf’s Law  
A rank-share distribution describes a particular relationship between the share and 
rank of a variable across a set of observational units.  It is related to the concept of a rank-size 
distribution. For instance, a rank-size distribution for city size exists if the relationship 
between the natural logarithm of size and of rank is linear and exhibits a negative slope. 
Zipf’s law arises when the slope value equals -1.  
The existence of Zipf’s law for city sizes is a widely documented empirical 
regularity.
4  Several explanations have been advanced for the observed regularity of Zipf’s 
law with respect to the distribution of city sizes.  Some argue it constitutes an optimal spatial 
pattern that arises when congestion and urbanization externalities interact as part of the 
process of development and growth of cities.  Such forces are usually found in core models of 
urban and regional growth
5.  Others have stressed more mechanical forces that often involve 
a random growth process for city size.  A recent example is Gabaix (1999a), who draws on 
Gibrat’s law
6 to assume that cities follow a random but common growth process.   
Normalizing city population by a country’s total population, Gabaix shows (his Proposition 
1) that if population shares evolve as geometric Brownian motion with an infinitesimal 
barrier then the steady state distribution of population shares will be a rank-size distribution 
that exhibits Zipf’s law. 
As previously noted, the equal-share property for members of an FIE, together with 
an assumed harmonization of FIE member’s economic policies, implies that the relative 
performance of any one FIE member can be considered a random variable.  Given this, we 
can adopt Gabaix’s (1999a) specification and assume that the share of variable j (e.g., j = 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Brakman et al. (2001), Fujita et al. (1999), Gabaix (1999b), Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), Eeckhout 
(2004) and Rose (2005). 
5 For example, see Eaton and Eckstein (1997), Black and Henderson (1999), Brakman et al. (1999). 
6 Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931) states that firm growth is independent of firm size.  
6 output) evolves as geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound
7, and moreover, that the 
distribution of growth rates of these shares is common to all FIE members (i.e., Gibrat’s 
law).
8  As in Gabaix (1999a), this implies that the limiting distribution of the shares of 
variable j across FIE members will be a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law.  
Empirical Specification 
Consider a FIE consisting of M members.  Let Smj denote member m’s share of the 
total FIE amount of variable j ( j = output (y), physical capital (k) or human capital (h)) and 
let Rmj denote the rank of member m in the ranking of shares of variable j across all members 
(m = 1,…, M).  We assume Rmj = 1 for the member with the largest share of variable j and Rmj 
= M for the member with the lowest share of variable j.  If variable j has a rank-share 
distribution then we can write:  
(9)  ()
j
mj j mj SR
β
γ =   
where βj < 0 is the power-law exponent and 0 < γj < 1 is the share of variable j for the 
member with the highest rank (i.e., Rmj = 1).  Zipf’s law corresponds to βj  = -1, and it implies 
a specific relationship among member shares, namely: S1j = 2S2j = 3S3j = … = MSMj.  This 
states, for example, that the share value of the highest ranked country is twice the share value 
of the second ranked country.  
To empirically assess the hypothesis that output and factor shares conform to a rank-
share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law we can take the natural logarithm of each side of 
(9) to obtain: 
                                                 
7 One needs to prevent output and factors from falling below some lower bound in order to obtain a power law. 
Otherwise the distribution would be lognormal. A lower bound makes sense in integrated areas as important 
income transfers are institutionalized to prevent states/regions/countries to vanish. For example, the E.U. 
maintains a social fund and a regional fund.  
8 The equal-share relationship implies that the common expected rate of growth is zero since the sum over i of 
the output and factor shares in (8) must be 1. 
7 (10)      () () log log mj j j mj mj SR θβ =+ + u h
                                                
1,..., ; , , mM j y k ==
where θj = log(γj) < 0 and umj is an error term assumed to have the usual properties (i.e., i.i.d. 
with mean zero and constant variance).  Estimates of the intercept and of the slope parameter 
in (10) are crucial to our analysis and are obtained by regressing the share of variable j on 
variable j’s rank value across FIE members.   
We estimate (10) separately for the output share, physical capital share and human 
capital share with respect to the 51 U.S. states and the 14 E.U. countries.  For U.S. states, we 
use annual cross-section data covering the period from 1990 to 2000.  For E.U. countries the 
data instead consist of cross-sections equally spaced at 5-year intervals; these data generally 
cover the period from 1965 to 2000.  A data appendix gives a complete description of data 
methods and sources. 
Given estimates of (10) for a given dependent variable, evidence against Zipf’s law 
can be assessed by testing if the estimated slope coefficient is significantly different from 
minus one.  However, Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) and Nishiyama and Osada (2004) 
recently demonstrate that both the OLS estimate of βj in (10) and its associated standard error 
are expected to be biased downward, with these biases diminishing as the number of 
observational units (M) increases.  Hence, without some correction for these inherent biases, 
one is likely to more often reject Zipf’s law when it is in fact true.   
To correct for these biases, we follow Gabaix and Ioannides (2004, p. 10) and 
conduct, for the cases M = 14 (E.U. countries) and M = 51 (U.S. States), a Monte Carlo 
analysis of the OLS slope estimates derived from (10) under the assumption that Zipf’s law 
holds.
9  The difference between the true slope value (-1) and the average of the OLS slope 
 
 
9 Briefly, for a given sample size M (either M = 14 or M = 51), 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations are performed 
drawing from an exact power law with coefficient 1 (Zipf’s Law).  This involved drawing M i.i.d. variables vm, 
uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], and then constructing sizes Lm = 1/vm.  The sizes Lm are then 
normalized into shares Sm that were then ordered and assigned a rank value Rm.  We then perform 100,000 OLS 
8 estimates gives an estimate of the downward bias, which is 0.172 for M = 14 and 0.081 for M 
= 51.  Given these estimates of the bias for each M, an estimate of the true slope coefficient is 
obtained by adding the estimated bias to the OLS estimate derived from (10).   
To obtain a bias adjusted estimate of the standard error we follow Nishiyama and 
Osada (2004) and use the asymptotic approximation to the true standard error of the OLS 
slope estimate given as  ˆ 2 j M β − , where  is the OLS estimate of the slope in (10). ˆ
j β
10   The 
test statistic formed using these bias corrected values has asymptotically a normal distribution 
(Nishiyama and Osada, 2004). 
Results 
The first two columns of Table 1 report OLS estimates of (10) for the share of output, 
physical capital and human capital for the sample of U.S. states; the first two columns of 
Table 2 report the OLS estimates for the sample of E.U. countries.
11  Over both set of results, 
the adjusted R-squares fall in the range from 0.791 to 0.945, indicating a strong relationship 
between the share and rank of each variable.  
In Table 1, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1”  indicates strong 
support for the hypotheses that the output and factor shares for U.S. states conform to a rank-
share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law; in no case can we reject (at the 5% level) the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient is significantly different from –1.  This is strong 
evidence that, for U.S. States, each of the three share distributions exhibit Zipf’s law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
regressions using the specification log(Sm) = θ + β log(Rm) + ui.   The complete results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
10 Another method for estimating the parameters of a power law distribution is the maximum likelihood Hill 
estimator (Hill, 1975).  However, as Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) remark, the properties of the Hill estimator in 
finite samples can be "very worrisome," and in particular their theoretical results predict a large bias in 
parameter estimates and associated standard errors in small samples.  We computed the Hill estimators (results 
not shown) and indeed found very high downward biases in both parameter estimates and standard errors.   
11 The standard errors associated with the OLS estimates are “robust” in the sense of White (1980). 
9 Table 1 - OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for U.S. States 
 
 
Variable Year  Intercept
 a  Slope 
b  Z-statistic Testing 





1990  -1.179 (0.248)
   -1.101  (0.081)  -0.092  0.887 
1991  -1.194 (0.248)
   -1.093  (0.081)  -0.055  0.884 
1992  -1.199 (0.252)
   -1.090  (0.082)  -0.042  0.883 
1993  -1.207 (0.258)
   -1.085  (0.084)  -0.019  0.881 
1994  -1.208 (0.265)
   -1.084  (0.086)  -0.014  0.876 
1995  -1.209 (0.265)
   -1.083  (0.086)  -0.009  0.874 
1996  -1.205 (0.267)
   -1.085  (0.087)  -0.019  0.872 
1997  -1.192 (0.271)
   -1.091  (0.088)  -0.046  0.868 
1998  -1.173 (0.272)
   -1.100  (0.088)  -0.087  0.868 
1999  -1.168 (0.271)
   -1.103  (0.088)  -0.101  0.866 
Output 
Share 
(M = 51) 
2000  -1.164 (0.266)
   -1.106  (0.087)  -0.114  0.868 
1990  -1.199 (0.246)
   -1.092  (0.080)  -0.051  0.892 
1991  -1.207 (0.247)  -1.089  (0.080)  -0.037  0.891 
1992  -1.200 (0.251)  -1.092  (0.081)  -0.051  0.892 
1993  -1.197 (0.257)  -1.093  (0.083)  -0.055  0.890 
1994  -1.196 (0.266)  -1.092  (0.086)  -0.051  0.884 
1995  -1.173 (0.275)  -1.102  (0.089)  -0.096  0.879 
1996  -1.168 (0.276)  -1.105  (0.089)  -0.110  0.878 
1997  -1.126 (0.286)  -1.125  (0.093)  -0.198  0.870 
1998  -1.126 (0.283)  -1.126  (0.091)  -0.202  0.876 




(M = 51) 
2000  -1.093 (0.282)  -1.143  (0.091)  -0.274  0.880 




(M = 51)  2000  -1.264 (0.293)  -1.054  (0.096)  0.129  0.839 
 
a OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All intercept coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
b OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level.  
c Computed as the OLS slope estimate minus (- 1) plus  0.081 (the bias) divided by the asymptotic 
approximation of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.198 = (2/51)
0.5). All 
slope coefficients are not significantly different from –1 at the 5% level. 
10 Table 2 - OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for E.U. Countries 
 
 
Variable Year  Intercept 
a  Slope 
b  Z-statistic Testing 
Slope = -1 
c  Adj. R
2 
1960  -0.645 (0.397)  -1.461  (0.192)  -0.523  0.908 
1965  -0.665 (0.416)  -1.435  (0.204)  -0.485  0.889 
1970  -0.699 (0.433)  -1.406  (0.212)  -0.440  0.867 
1975  -0.742 (0.435)  -1.366  (0.211)  -0.376  0.859 
1980  -0.755 (0.419)  -1.357  (0.202)  -0.361  0.870 
1985  -0.763 (0.417)  -1.354  (0.199)  -0.356  0.872 
1990  -0.772 (0.420)  -1.346  (0.198)  -0.342  0.872 
1995  -0.777 (0.405)  -1.343  (0.187)  -0.337  0.878 
Output 
Share 
(M = 14) 
2000  -0.857 (0.376)
*  -1.272  (0.170)  -0.208  0.885 
1965  -0.816 (0.417)  -1.293  (0.217)  -0.248  0.851 
1970  -0.825 (0.396)  -1.275  (0.208)  -0.214  0.858 
1975  -0.836 (0.388)
*  -1.262  (0.203)  -0.189  0.858 
1980  -0.760 (0.484)  -1.332  (0.245)  -0.318  0.828 
1985  -0.732 (0.404)
 *  -1.358  (0.205)  -0.362  0.870 
1990  -0.670 (0.398)  -1.418  (0.206)  -0.459  0.873 




(M = 14) 
2000  -0.658 (0.382)  -1.431  (0.186)  -0.479  0.904 
1960  -0.147 (0.448)  -2.103  (0.287)  -1.171  0.791 
1965  -0.343 (0.341)  -1.890  (0.184)  -1.005  0.880 
1970  -0.529 (0.280)
 *  -1.639  (0.176)  -0.754  0.865 
1975  -0.642 (0.236)
 **  -1.518  (0.126)  -0.603  0.928 
1980  -0.683 (0.239)
 **  -1.433  (0.122)  -0.482  0.933 
1985  -0.747 (0.185)
 **  -1.409  (0.092)  -0.445  0.945 
1990  -0.895 (0.191)
 **  -1.241  (0.112)  -0.147  0.912 
1995  -0.897 (0.201)




(M = 14) 
2000  -0.905 (0.196)
 **  -1.215  (0.110)  -0.094  0.919 
 
a OLS standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at ** = p < 0.05 or *  = p < 0.10  
b OLS standard errors in parentheses.  All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
c Computed as the OLS slope estimate minus  (-1) plus 0.172 (the bias) divided by the asymptotic 
approximation of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.3779 = (2/14)
0.5).  All 




11 Likewise, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1” in Table 2 indicates also 
strong support for the hypotheses that the output and factor shares for E.U. countries conform 
to a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law: we cannot reject (at 5% level) the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient is significantly different from -1.  These findings for 
U.S. states and for E.U. countries are striking empirical results.
12 
3  Further Characterization of Integrated Economies  
The empirical findings of the preceding section have further implications regarding 
the characterization of integrated economies.  One implication is the potential empirical 
validity of the equal-share relationship as derived in (8) since, if Zipf’s Law holds, the output 
shares across countries, or shares of any given factor, are proportional.  Hence, if the equal-
share relationship holds for one country then it must then also hold for all other countries.  A 
second implication is that if Zipf’s Law holds then the limiting share values across FIE 
members are completely determined once the number of FIE members is specified.   
Equal-share Relationship  
A test for the equal-share relationship involves the null hypothesis given by equation 
(8) against the alternative hypothesis given by (7).  Evidence in favor of the equal-share 
relationship can be obtained in two steps: (1) test for homogeneity of the OLS slope estimates 
(i.e., whether βy = βk = βh) to verify that the distributions of shares come from a common 
power-law distribution and (2) test for homogeneity of the intercepts across the three share 
equations (i.e., whether θy = θk = θh) to examine if the equal-share relationship holds with 
respect to the highest ranked member of each FIE (i.e., California for U.S. states and 
                                                 
12 By comparison, we preformed similar tests for 30 developing countries and a “world” of 55 countries but no 
evidence of Zipf’s law was found at the usual significance levels. 
12 Germany for E.U. countries).
13  Failure to reject the null hypothesis would imply that 
technological differences and factor market imperfections are not strong enough to prevent 
the equal-share relationship from holding in a statistical sense. 
  
Table 3 - Results Testing the Equal-Share Relationship 
 
 
p-values for testing across-equation  
homogeneity of  Integrated Economy  Year 
intercepts slopes
 
1990 0.9680  0.9014 
U.S. States 
2000 0.8241  0.5964 
1965 0.6063  0.0445 
a 
1970 0.8011  0.2797 
1975 0.8619  0.3655 
1980 0.9689  0.8461 
1985 0.9969  0.9305 
1990 0.8111  0.6034 
1995 0.7124  0.3697 
European Union 
2000 0.7291  0.4072 
 
a Cross-equation homogeneity rejected at 5% level. 
 
Table 3 reports p-values for testing the hypotheses of slope homogeneity and of 
intercept homogeneity across the three share distributions in each sample year.
14   For U.S. 
states, in neither of the two years for which data are available on all three shares (1990 and 
                                                 
13 Equally, it can be demonstrated that the equal-share property obtains if one assumes 1) that output shares 
alone exhibit Zipf’s law and 2) that FIE members have identical, homogenous of degree one, production 
functions. 
14 These tests are performed by establishing, in each year, a system comprising the three share equations but 
without initially imposing any cross-equation parameter restrictions. 
13 2000) can we reject the hypotheses of intercept equality and slope equality, supporting the 
equal-share relationship for U.S. states.  The results for E.U. countries also indicate support 
for the equal-share relationship. These test results are based on slope estimates uncorrected 
for bias.  However, correcting for the expected downward bias would only strengthen the 
support for the equal-share relationship evidenced here.   
Limiting Distribution of Shares  
Let  Vmj denote the level of variable j for member m.  Assume, without loss of 
generality, that member 1 has the highest value of variable j and let δmj be member m’s value 
of variable j relative to that of member 1 (i.e., δmj = Vmj / V1j), so that δ1j = 1.   Now order the 
values of variable j in descending order.  This ordering of the values of variable j across the 
m = 1, …, M members can be written:  
(11)  V1j  >  δ2j V1j  >  δ3j V1j  > ... >  δMj V1j . 
Since the total FIE amount of variable j is (1 + δ1j + δ2j + …+ δMj)V1j, (11) implies the 












 1:   ;
1 ...
 2:   ;
1 ...





































Expressions (12) indicate that sequence of shares Smj is a Harmonic series, where each 
share value Smj depends on the values of the δ’s and the number of members M.  Accepting 
our preceding empirical evidence that the distribution of shares exhibits Zipf’s law then 
δ2j = 1/2, δ3j = 1/3, δ4j = 1/4, etc., so that the theoretical shares in (12) can be computed once 
14 the number of members (M) is specified.  For example, the theoretical share values for the M 
= 51 U.S. states are: 0.2213, 0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553, …, 0.0043.   For the M = 14 E.U. 
countries the theoretical share values are: 0.3075, 0.1538, 0.1025, 0.0769, …, 0.0220. 
We conduct correlation and graphical analyses to gain insight on whether the 
observed distribution of shares conforms to the theoretically expected distribution of shares 
computed using (12).  The relationship between actual shares and those computed from (12) 
is investigated in Table 4 which reports simple correlation coefficients between the natural 
logarithms of these shares for U.S. states and E.U countries in 1990 and 2000. The 
correlations range from 0.9176 to 0.9619 and all are highly significant, indicating a strong 
positive relationship between actual and theoretical shares. 
 
Table 4 – Correlations between Logarithm of Actual and Theoretical Output and 
Factor Shares for U.S. States and E.U. Countries, 1990 and 2000 
 
 
Correlation Between Logarithm of Actual Shares and 
Theoretical Shares of   Integrated 
Economy  Year 
Output  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
1990  0.9429 0.9456 0.9258 
U.S. States 
2000  0.9332 0.9393 0.9176 
1990  0.9392 0.9397 0.9397  European 




15 Figure 1: Theoretical and Actual Share Distributions for U.S. States and E.U. Countries 
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16   Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation of the share distributions by plotting the 
logarithm of the theoretically expected shares assuming Zipf’s law holds and the logarithm of 
the actual shares in 2000 for each integrated economy.  By definition, the theoretical shares 
(in logs) lie on a straight line with slope -1.  Examination of the figures indicates that similar 
patterns between actual and theoretical shares appear for all three variables, whether for U.S. 
states or for E.U. countries.  For example, for U.S. states, the graphs indicate that the share 
for the first observation (rank 1) is below the theoretical first share while in the middle range 
of the distribution the actual share is above the theoretical share.  For E.U. countries the 
actual first share is instead very close to the theoretical share.   
There are several explanations for the observed deviation in actual share values from 
their theoretical values. One is that the theoretical share distribution is a steady state 
prediction and our sample values may not represent this ideal.  Another is that our theoretical 
model assumes that each FIE is “closed,” in that goods and factor flows arise only between 
FIE members.  In reality, both U.S. states and E.U. countries have important trade and factor 
flow linkages with entities outside these defined integrated economies.  A third is that, since 
the shares for a given variable sum to unity across observations, the sum of their differences 
at each rank (i.e., the “residual”) must be zero.  Hence, the sum of any positive “residuals” 
must be offset by the sum of negative “residuals.”  To an approximation, this same result will 
hold for the sum of the difference between the shares at each rank when measured in 
logarithms. 
4. Discussion 
We examined empirically for evidence that the distribution of output and factor shares 
exhibit Zipf’s law with respect to two integrated economies: the 51 U.S. states and 14 E.U. 
countries. The findings indicate that Zipf’s law indeed holds for the distribution of these 
shares among U.S. states and also among E.U. countries. While there may be several 
17 explanations for this empirical finding, the evidence on the empirical significance of Zipf’s 
law is consistent with a model that assumes that the growth process of the shares of members 
of an integrated economy is random and homogeneous across members. 
Our empirical results also supported the existence of the equal-share relationship for 
both U.S. states and E.U. countries.  This evidence leads to several implications regarding the 
characterization of integrated economies.  First, the equal-share relationship addresses Lucas’ 
(1990) question as to why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. Namely, an 
economy with a low level (and hence a low share) of human capital will also have a low 
share of physical capital, and also a low share of output. Second, if the equal-share 
relationship holds, then all members of an integrated economy will have the same output per 
efficiency unit of labor. This implication is the essence of the absolute convergence 
hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.47), here interpreted in terms of efficiency units 
of labor, not in per capita terms.  Finally, the empirical significance of the equal-share 
relationship is consistent with the relative growth performance of members of an integrated 
economy being largely random, and hence strongly dependent on particular states of nature. 
Such randomness will be more true the greater the extent of economic integration among 
members, perhaps most exemplified by the integrated economy comprising U.S. states. 
Hence, it is more likely to be true the more harmonized are education systems and fiscal 
codes, when members do not run independent monetary policies, and when industrial policies 
are quickly imitated across members. 
  We also derived the result that, when Zipf’s law holds, the values of the output and 
factor shares for members of a fully integrated economy are completely determined once the 
number of members is specified.  These shares are limiting values that derive from the 
relative position (rank) of each member and would be expected to emerge as integrated 
18 economies approach full integration.  Nonetheless, a comparison of actual share values to 
these theoretically expected share values indicated a high degree of agreement.  
In providing evidence for Zipf’s law and the equal-share relationship with respect to 
members of an integrated economy, this paper indicates that these empirical characterizations 
should be kept in mind when studying the implications of alternative policies on the relative 
growth of members of an integrated economic area.  
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23 Appendix – Data Methods and Sources 
The output for each of the 51 U.S. states is measured by real gross state product as 
reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
15  These data are available yearly 
from 1990 to 2000.   
Estimates of state physical capital stocks are derived from BEA (2002) estimates of 
the total U.S. physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial sectors comprising all 
economic activity.
16   These national physical capital stocks in each industry are allocated to 
each state by multiplying an industry’s total capital stock
17 by that industry’s contribution to a 
state’s total income.
18  These industry capital stock estimates are then summed, for each state, 
to obtain an estimate of a state’s total stock of physical capital.
19  The calculation performed 








 =  ∑  
In this equation, km(t) is the stock of physical capital in state m, ymj(t) is value added 
by industry j in state m  (m = 1…51), Ym(t) is state m’s total value added, and Kj(t) is the 
national level stock of physical capital in industry j (j = 1,…, 9).  This procedure assumes that 
the capital-to-output ratio within an industry j (i.e., kmj(t)/ymj(t)) is the same across U.S. states, 
that is, kmj(t)/ymj(t) = Km(t)/Ym(t).  In turn, this assumption implies that an industry is in a 
common steady state across all U.S. states.
20  For example, the agricultural sector in Texas is 
in the same steady state as its counterpart in Oregon, and the manufacturing sector in 
                                                 
15 Data on gross state product available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp 
16 The sectors (BEA code) are Farming (81), Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other (100); Mining 
(200); Construction (300); Manufacturing (400); Transportation(500); Wholesale and retail trade (610); Finance, 
insurance and real estate (700); and Services (800). 
17  Data on state physical capital stocks by industry were taken from U.S. Fixed Assets Tables, available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb 
18 Annual data on state value added available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi 
19 This procedure follows that used by Munnel (1990) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). 
20 If a sector is converging towards its steady state, the output-to-capital ratio would be below its steady-state 
value. This only poses a problem if the initial output-to-capital ratios vary across U.S. states. If the ratios do 
vary, the procedure would allocate too much to those states further from steady-state and too little to those states 
closer to their steady state.  
24 Pennsylvania is in the same steady state as its counterpart in Ohio.
21  The constructed 
physical capital data are from 1990 to 2000, on a yearly basis. 
Human capital stocks for U.S. states are proxied by the number of persons with at 
least secondary level education. They are derived from data on state educational attainment 
taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
22  Census data on educational attainment are 
available only every 10 years, which limited the construction of human capital stocks to two 
years: 1990, and 2000. 
For E.U. countries, each country’s total output is measured by its real gross domestic 
product (GDP) derived from the data on real GDP per capita (base year = 1996) and 
population in Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).  The output data 
are available annually from 1960 to 2000. 
Data on E.U. physical capital stocks are derived from Penn World Tables 5.6 (Heston 
and Summers, 1991a and 1991b) which reports four data series for each country: (1) 
population, (2) physical capital stock per worker, (3) real GDP per capita and (4) real GDP 
per worker.  The physical capital stocks for each country are constructed as the product of the 
first three series divided by the last series.  The data covers the period 1965-1990.  Physical 
capital stock data for E.U. countries are also available from Timmer et al. (2003) covering 
period 1980-2000.
23  These data sources are combined to have physical capital stock data in 
each of seven years from 1965 to 2000.
24 
Each E.U. country’s stock of human capital stock is measured by multiplying the 
percentage of a country’s population having at least a secondary level of education with the 
                                                 
21 If a sector has a different steady state, and hence a different capital-to-output ratio, the procedure will allocate 
too much to states with lower ratios and too little to states with higher ratios.  However, this possibility is 
unlikely if competition lead firms in all states to adopt the best available production technology. 
22 Decennial Census dataset available at http://factfinder.census.gov 
23 Physical capital database available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml 
24 Estimation was conducted using both sets of data for E.U. countries.  No qualitative difference in results was 
found for the years in which data were available from both sources (i.e., 1980, 1985 and 1990).  For these three 
years we therefore report only the results using the capital stock data from Timmer et al. (2003). 
25 country’s total population.  Data on the rate of educational attainment for each country are 
taken from Barro and Lee (1993, 1996, and 2000).
25  Data on a country’s population are from 
Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).  Since data on rates of educational attainment are only 
available every 5 years, the data sample is limited to five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.  
Following this constraint, the output and physical capital stocks are also obtained in five-year 
intervals. 
  The 14 E.U. countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
26 
                                                 
25 Other studies using the Barro-Lee data include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Barro 
(1999), Easterly and Levine (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
26 Luxembourg is excluded for lack of data on human capital. Given the small scale of Luxembourg’s economy 
relative to other E.U. countries this omission is unlikely to affect the E.U. results. 
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